http://www.vabest.com/blog/ Virginia's Best Catalog Group Blog en-us Sat, 11 Oct 2008 22:33:48 America/New_York Sat, 11 Oct 2008 22:33:48 America/New_York http://www.vabest.com/blog/docs.html Weblog Editor 2.0 editor@example.com webmaster@example.com http://www.vabest.com/blog/showpost.html?bid=8 Virginia's Best was recently invited to join the Amazon Gourmet Food category by an Amazon sales VP, but when we tried to sign up a few months later, we found that the Gourmet Food category is closed to new applications. Amazon.com is no longer accepting new vendors in their Gourmet Food category. They have a new Grocery category and are concentrating on a more mass-market product grouping. Existing Gourmet vendors are being folded into the new Grocery category as appropriate, while some are being "retired." The change makes sense for Amazon, where specialty gourmet food products never really fit in with iPods and shoes. The change is also good for gourmet food vendors by eliminating the "400 pound gorilla" in our market. Amazon seems to be going a little wild lately and growing into a wide variety of different directions while removing previous projects, all with little or no notice. Too much money, not enough sense? Who knows? But it is certainly fascinating to watch... Added this later: There's a little more to this story than I told so far. About a year before the "invitation" to join Amazon, I signed up VB as an Amazon Seller. On the sign-up page, they mentioned that the Gourmet category had to be approved. It did not say the category was closed. So, I finished the sign-up process and requested approval. To my surprise, the rejected my request and told me the Gourmet category was closed to new vendors. Well, it's their site, they can do whatever they want. Silly me, I assumed that if I'm not able to get into the category I need, then the seller membership would be cancelled. Oh no, far from it. A few weeks later, I noticed the monthly fee on my card statement. This was especially surprising since they had not asked for my card number during the signup process! They saw I signed up under my Amazon username, so they took the card number already on file from retail purchases, and used it to charge the sellers' fees without any explicit notice or permission! Okay, so I figure, they will see that I could not get into the category I needed, and refund the charges, right? Wrong. They took no responsibility for their own actions and were rude to me too. Appearantly, I was expected to start selling lawn mowers now because that category was open, and it wasn't their fault that I did not want to sell garden equipment. Long story short, I had to contact an Amazon vice president and threaten to sue them before they would refund the charges! Nice. Really nice. So when the invitation to join came from that same VP some months later, I thought everything would be better now. They're inviting me to join, so they must have reopened the category and everything will be okay. Nope. Exactly the same thing happened again. This is what happens when a company gets too big. The more people you put together in a huge corporation, the lower the total IQ of the aggregate beast becomes. Of course, If I had been some big, well-known merchant, the story would probably have been much different. The moral of the story is Amazon cannot be trusted. They will take your money and give nothing in return. And they don't care. So what else is new? How many times has something similar happened to you? We seem to be suffering from a huge integrity deficit. Thu, 10 Apr 2008 05:03:57 GMT http://www.vabest.com/blog/showpost.html?bid=8 http://www.vabest.com/blog/showpost.html?bid=6 NEW YORK TIMES, OP-ED CONTRIBUTORS; The War as We Saw It By BUDDHIKA JAYAMAHA, WESLEY D. SMITH, JEREMY ROEBUCK, OMAR MORA, EDWARD SANDMEIER, YANCE T. GRAY AND JEREMY A. MURPHY Published: August 19, 2007 Baghdad VIEWED from Iraq at the tail end of a 15-month deployment, the political debate in Washington is indeed surreal. Counterinsurgency is, by definition, a competition between insurgents and counterinsurgents for the control and support of a population. To believe that Americans, with an occupying force that long ago outlived its reluctant welcome, can win over a recalcitrant local population and win this counterinsurgency is far-fetched. As responsible infantrymen and noncommissioned officers with the 82nd Airborne Division soon heading back home, we are skeptical of recent press coverage portraying the conflict as increasingly manageable and feel it has neglected the mounting civil, political and social unrest we see every day. (Obviously, these are our personal views and should not be seen as official within our chain of command.) The claim that we are increasingly in control of the battlefields in Iraq is an assessment arrived at through a flawed, American-centered framework. Yes, we are militarily superior, but our successes are offset by failures elsewhere. What soldiers call the ''battle space'' remains the same, with changes only at the margins. It is crowded with actors who do not fit neatly into boxes: Sunni extremists, Al Qaeda terrorists, Shiite militiamen, criminals and armed tribes. This situation is made more complex by the questionable loyalties and Janus-faced role of the Iraqi police and Iraqi Army, which have been trained and armed at United States taxpayers' expense. A few nights ago, for example, we witnessed the death of one American soldier and the critical wounding of two others when a lethal armor-piercing explosive was detonated between an Iraqi Army checkpoint and a police one. Local Iraqis readily testified to American investigators that Iraqi police and Army officers escorted the triggermen and helped plant the bomb. These civilians highlighted their own predicament: had they informed the Americans of the bomb before the incident, the Iraqi Army, the police or the local Shiite militia would have killed their families. As many grunts will tell you, this is a near-routine event. Reports that a majority of Iraqi Army commanders are now reliable partners can be considered only misleading rhetoric. The truth is that battalion commanders, even if well meaning, have little to no influence over the thousands of obstinate men under them, in an incoherent chain of command, who are really loyal only to their militias. Similarly, Sunnis, who have been underrepresented in the new Iraqi armed forces, now find themselves forming militias, sometimes with our tacit support. Sunnis recognize that the best guarantee they may have against Shiite militias and the Shiite-dominated government is to form their own armed bands. We arm them to aid in our fight against Al Qaeda. However, while creating proxies is essential in winning a counterinsurgency, it requires that the proxies are loyal to the center that we claim to support. Armed Sunni tribes have indeed become effective surrogates, but the enduring question is where their loyalties would lie in our absence. The Iraqi government finds itself working at cross purposes with us on this issue because it is justifiably fearful that Sunni militias will turn on it should the Americans leave. In short, we operate in a bewildering context of determined enemies and questionable allies, one where the balance of forces on the ground remains entirely unclear. (In the course of writing this article, this fact became all too clear: one of us, Staff Sergeant Murphy, an Army Ranger and reconnaissance team leader, was shot in the head during a ''time-sensitive target acquisition mission'' on Aug. 12; he is expected to survive and is being flown to a military hospital in the United States.) While we have the will and the resources to fight in this context, we are effectively hamstrung because realities on the ground require measures we will always refuse -- namely, the widespread use of lethal and brutal force. Given the situation, it is important not to assess security from an American-centered perspective. The ability of, say, American observers to safely walk down the streets of formerly violent towns is not a resounding indicator of security. What matters is the experience of the local citizenry and the future of our counterinsurgency. When we take this view, we see that a vast majority of Iraqis feel increasingly insecure and view us as an occupation force that has failed to produce normalcy after four years and is increasingly unlikely to do so as we continue to arm each warring side. Coupling our military strategy to an insistence that the Iraqis meet political benchmarks for reconciliation is also unhelpful. The morass in the government has fueled impatience and confusion while providing no semblance of security to average Iraqis. Leaders are far from arriving at a lasting political settlement. This should not be surprising, since a lasting political solution will not be possible while the military situation remains in constant flux. The Iraqi government is run by the main coalition partners of the Shiite-dominated United Iraqi Alliance, with Kurds as minority members. The Shiite clerical establishment formed the alliance to make sure its people did not succumb to the same mistake as in 1920: rebelling against the occupying Western force (then the British) and losing what they believed was their inherent right to rule Iraq as the majority. The qualified and reluctant welcome we received from the Shiites since the invasion has to be seen in that historical context. They saw in us something useful for the moment. Now that moment is passing, as the Shiites have achieved what they believe is rightfully theirs. Their next task is to figure out how best to consolidate the gains, because reconciliation without consolidation risks losing it all. Washington's insistence that the Iraqis correct the three gravest mistakes we made -- de-Baathification, the dismantling of the Iraqi Army and the creation of a loose federalist system of government -- places us at cross purposes with the government we have committed to support. Political reconciliation in Iraq will occur, but not at our insistence or in ways that meet our benchmarks. It will happen on Iraqi terms when the reality on the battlefield is congruent with that in the political sphere. There will be no magnanimous solutions that please every party the way we expect, and there will be winners and losers. The choice we have left is to decide which side we will take. Trying to please every party in the conflict -- as we do now -- will only ensure we are hated by all in the long run. At the same time, the most important front in the counterinsurgency, improving basic social and economic conditions, is the one on which we have failed most miserably. Two million Iraqis are in refugee camps in bordering countries. Close to two million more are internally displaced and now fill many urban slums. Cities lack regular electricity, telephone services and sanitation. ''Lucky'' Iraqis live in gated communities barricaded with concrete blast walls that provide them with a sense of communal claustrophobia rather than any sense of security we would consider normal. In a lawless environment where men with guns rule the streets, engaging in the banalities of life has become a death-defying act. Four years into our occupation, we have failed on every promise, while we have substituted Baath Party tyranny with a tyranny of Islamist, militia and criminal violence. When the primary preoccupation of average Iraqis is when and how they are likely to be killed, we can hardly feel smug as we hand out care packages. As an Iraqi man told us a few days ago with deep resignation, ''We need security, not free food.'' In the end, we need to recognize that our presence may have released Iraqis from the grip of a tyrant, but that it has also robbed them of their self-respect. They will soon realize that the best way to regain dignity is to call us what we are -- an army of occupation -- and force our withdrawal. Until that happens, it would be prudent for us to increasingly let Iraqis take center stage in all matters, to come up with a nuanced policy in which we assist them from the margins but let them resolve their differences as they see fit. This suggestion is not meant to be defeatist, but rather to highlight our pursuit of incompatible policies to absurd ends without recognizing the incongruities. We need not talk about our morale. As committed soldiers, we will see this mission through. Buddhika Jayamaha is an Army specialist. Wesley D. Smith is a sergeant. Jeremy Roebuck is a sergeant. Omar Mora is a sergeant. Edward Sandmeier is a sergeant. Yance T. Gray is a staff sergeant. Jeremy A. Murphy is a staff sergeant. Mon, 27 Aug 2007 04:25:38 GMT http://www.vabest.com/blog/showpost.html?bid=6 http://www.vabest.com/blog/showpost.html?bid=5 Cavalier sounds like a great deal for those of us who might want to escape the tyranny of Verizon's overlords. You do get a lot of good features in one package for no "extra" charges, but beware! The price they quote of $24.95 per month neglects to mention that the fees and taxes they so glibly gloss over amount to more than 50% of that amount. Therefore, your $24.95 bill is instantly inflated to $41.70, not including long distance charges. Yes, that's right, more than $15 in additional fees and taxes. The bottom line is almost exactly the same as Verizon's bill. Some of those fees are unique to Cavalier's business type, so there was every reason to disclose them in detail. They are not specific even on the bill, but there is an $8 fee every month for access to Verizon's lines. Cavalier is your phone company, but Verizon still owns the lines and the primary switching equipment, so there's a fee for access, which is passed on to the customer. On the web site they mention that there will be additional charges, but they never give any clue that they will be so high. Bottom line, if they will lie to you about this, don't trust them with anything else. They are just as bad as Verizon as far as the dirty tricks go. At least with Verizon you don't have another variable to deal with. Fri, 17 Aug 2007 03:39:27 GMT http://www.vabest.com/blog/showpost.html?bid=5 http://www.vabest.com/blog/showpost.html?bid=4 Ever heard of whosarat.com? Neither had I, until today when I heard about it on the news. Appearantly, some dope dealer turned against his cohorts and caused them to be locked up in jail. For revenge, the dealer guy put up a website that exposes "snitches" and has even gone so far as to post notices in neighborhoods where they live. Obviously, this is counterproductive behavior. We have enough trouble without exposing the few who make some effort to make things better (whatever their motivation). The problem is that all the information comes from public records. Legally, nothing can be done about it, because the website owner is not really at fault. It's the government's fault for making the information public in the first place. Any restriction on publication of public information would be unconstitutional. If a "snitch" comes to harm as a result of this information being published, who do you think they are going to blame or sue? Not the government - you can't sue them! No, the little guy that put up the website will be blamed. Sure, he's a jack___ and needs a good hard slap, but he has a right not to suffer for government stupidity. At least as much as the rest of us do. Tue, 22 May 2007 19:47:41 GMT http://www.vabest.com/blog/showpost.html?bid=4 http://www.vabest.com/blog/showpost.html?bid=3 Where do our products come from? Here and there... everywhere! Like every major cataloger, we do not make all the products we sell. This is true of even the most well known catalogs, like Williams Sonoma, Dean and Deluca, Harry and David, etc. The balance between sources varies from one to the other, but none of them make everything themselves. The trouble is that most catalogs don't even mention this at all. In fact, they often go to some lengths to obscure the actual makers of the products they sell. They don't want their competitors to get and sell the same products for less. Also, it's a marketing ploy popular in the trade called "private labeling." It's common practice and involves placing the catalog company's name on labels of products made by other companies. It's so common in fact that no one thinks of it as deceptive. If someone told you this was "Grandma's Southern Applebutter" and it turned out to be made in a Romanian factory, would you think you had been lied to? I would. That's an extreme example, but it does happen. That's why we don't use private labels and we disclose the origin of every product we sell. Truth and full disclosure is best, since a convenient lie is still just a lie. Most of our products come from small vendors. A small vendor is any company not engaged in mass production. When they start telling us about the 18-wheeler loads of "product" going out on loading dock 24, we just end the call there. I believe that once a maker starts producing that much of anything, so many compromises have to be made that the quality of the product vanishes. The best products come from individuals or very small companies that specialize in one or just a few products. That way they can concentrate on the quality of the goods, not just on their profits. I search for new products from quality makers almost every day. I hope you enjoy them! Tue, 22 May 2007 03:27:19 GMT http://www.vabest.com/blog/showpost.html?bid=3 http://www.vabest.com/blog/showpost.html?bid=2 That would be me, Tom, the guy that runs this business. I know it's hard to believe, but this "vast empire" was created and is run by one person. For a small business, our websites have more features than the average site, almost as many as big sites, like Amazon. That's because I am also a programmer of some considerable talent (biased?). Every page and feature was designed and coded by me - there is no rented shopping cart or purchased software anywhere. The only thing rented is the blank server that everything runs on. I may be grumpy sometimes, but I always try to do my best to meet my customers' needs. You have no idea how difficult my life is. Frankly, I don't know anyone who has even a quarter of my load. I'm not bragging, nor asking for pity. Just sharing. Sometimes people get really bent when their order does not ship as quickly as they think it should. Sorry, when it's my fault, it's because I just can't get to it. That's why I added the detailed shipping times to every product description. Now customers can see best and worst case shipping times for every product. So, if they actually read what's on the screen, they should not be surprised when their order comes in two weeks instead of overnight. Tue, 15 May 2007 02:13:25 GMT http://www.vabest.com/blog/showpost.html?bid=2 http://www.vabest.com/blog/showpost.html?bid=1 Welcome to the VBCG Blog ... I am starting this "web log" to help open a better dialog with our customers, and also to provide more information about our products and our company. I hope you find this as interesting as I do. I won't bore you with the detailed history of the company. Let it suffice to say that we started in 2001 and have been through one major transition and many smaller evolutions. Our focus is on high-quality specialty food and related items. We sell products via several websites, each with a special regional emphasis. We're still growing, sometimes a lot faster than I can handle. (It took almost three weeks to clear all the invoices from the holidays this year.) But I still try to keep customer relations on a personal level. Just email me - ask me anything... Happy reading! Mon, 07 May 2007 16:44:47 GMT http://www.vabest.com/blog/showpost.html?bid=1